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Non-governmental organisations operating in Tanzania and seeking to transform themselves 
into regulated microfinance institutions are currently facing the difficult task of establishing 
who the owners of their organisations are – a crucial factor that is limiting their ability to 
secure transformation and hence to get access to further funding. As an integral part of the 
Leverhulme-funded research project “Optimising the Dual Goals of Microfinance” this 
briefing paper presents preliminary results of field research undertaken in Tanzania during 
August 2009.1 One of the major findings is that gaining access to equity capital is the primary 
concern of many of these organisations and hence identifying the best strategies to institute 
shareholding partnerships is paramount. 
  
 
The focal microfinance institutions  
Two main microfinance institutions were the focus of analysis during field research: PRIDE and 
SEDA, although others were also visited. PRIDE, which stands for Promotion of Rural Initiative 
and Development Enterprises, started its operations in January 1994 with its first branch and 
head office in Arusha. Now, the number of branches has expanded to 41 in 5 zones (Lake, 
Dodoma/central, Dar-es-Salaam/Coastal, Arusha and Mwanga).  
The Small Enterprise Development Agency, SEDA, meanwhile, was initiated by World Vision 
Tanzania as a pilot project in 1995 in Arusha. At present, it makes loans through a network of 
three primary branches, i.e. Arusha, Moshi and Mwanza, and four field offices namely 
Shinyanga, Dodoma, Babati, Kahama. 
The following reports observations mainly of the first microfinance institution. The main 
purpose of this initial visit to Tanzania was to help establish who the key partners of the focal 
microfinance institutions are and how and why their relationships change over time. 
Key findings 
Some main findings originating from an analysis of PRIDE evolution can be summarised in the 
following timeline: 
 
                                                          
1
 The research followed during fieldwork included semi-structured interviews with 43 key informants of 
microfinance institutions in Dar-es-Salaam and Arusha; and data collection of financial flows and 
institutional reports. 
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 1994: A grant bilateral government agreement with Norway creates the 
programme. The Bank of Tanzania had representation at the Board of Directors. 
 2001: End of grant. Start of borrowing (first loans are small, e.g. SELF). 
 2005: New PRIDE loan products are introduced, e.g. individual loans, loans to 
SACCOs. As a proportion of total loans, group lending (the original product, for 
poorer clients) seems to be declining. If this is the case, there might be possible 
mission drift.  
 2006: New and larger borrowing from institutions. 
 2005: Transformation to regulated financial institution was supposed be 
completed. 
 2008: Government letter states that the original grant (revolving fund) belongs to 
PRIDE. This was a contentious issue that reflected the existing ambiguity with 
regard to institutional ownership i.e. was the owner the Government or was the 
institution private?   
 2008: Internal separation within the institution: PRIDE-NGO and MFC (PRIDE MFI). 
This marks an important strategic decision: the institution voluntarily decides to 
separate the operations that are purely financial from the ones that are non-
financial. This is to signal to the country’s regulators that the organisation can 
operate as a purely financial institution even before being awarded the licence.  
 2009: Expectation to become a regulated bank. Proposal to the Bank of Tanzania 
to get a licence. 
 2009: Ongoing negotiations to attract capital from investors in preparation for the 
transformation – mainly local but also international. Main challenge: to find the 
right shareholders to provide equity capital. 
It is interesting to note the group lending methodology followed by the institution under 
study: credit officers only see customers at the branch when members meet – except when 
officers want to recruit customers or market products. Community people themselves assess 
potential group members to decide whether or not to accept them in their groups (e.g. issues 
of credit-worthiness, etc). Customers have to travel to branches to receive loans and to repay 
loans. Branches keep cash for these operations. Branches tend to be set up in places where 
there is a National Microfinance Bank (NMB) branch so that the branch can get cash from the 
NMB. In cases where there is no branch, the police escort PRIDE staff to transfer money to the 
branch.  
A credit officer looks after 20 groups and then she/he is reassigned to a different set of groups. 
PRIDE states that there is a low turnover of credit officers.  
In addition, compulsory savings are demanded from clients, which represent 10% of any type 
of loan. This is called a Loan Insurance Fund (LIF). One remarkable fact is that PRIDE on-lends 
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the compulsory savings (LIF). In other words, LIF is another source of capital for the MFI. The 
institution has relatively effective Management Information System (MIS) but there is no 
connectivity to branches and little integration/reporting of information/data from branches to 
central office. However, a new MIS is being deployed.  
Evolution of financial sources and partners 
Based on Figure 1, some important observations can be derived:  
 
i. Borrowing started in 2002. Before 2002, PRIDE operated with grants only.  
ii. Breaking point in trend analysis of financial evolution is 2006. 
iii. Marked difference in number of financial partners/lenders: During 2002-2005 there 
were two main financial partners, i.e. SELF, a government programme, and the National 
Microfinance Bank (NMB). From 2006 the number of financial partners has increased to 
eight who were active at different points in time. At June 2009, six financial partners are 
active, i.e. NMB, Stromme, Triodos, INCOFIN and Oxfam Novib. 
iv. Stable relationship with two financial partners (NMB and Stromme), i.e. those present 
during 2002-2005.  
v. In terms of borrowing amount: two main partners are INCOFIN (40% of total borrowing 
at June 2009) and NMB (28% of total). NMB lending to PRIDE has grown steadily over 
2002-2009. INCOFIN lending is stable at US dollars (but in Tanzanian shillings appears as 
growing due to the fluctuation in exchange rate). INCOFIN is also an important partner 
because it is a potential shareholder of PRIDE-MFC. 
vi. AFRICAP: Political influence (a Kenyan partner decided to stop lending to all PRIDE 
institutions in Africa). 
vii. SELF: PRIDE decided to discontinue borrowing from SELF because the terms and 
conditions were onerous (i.e. too much reporting and target requirements). 
viii. TRIODOS: Due to the current financial crisis, TRIODOS has changed the terms and 
conditions and requested PRIDE to pay off the debt before the originally agreed date. 
ix. INCOFIN and Calvert: These loans are denominated in US dollars. Bullet payments in 
both; i.e. the principal is paid at a pre-determined date. They are both hedged by a bank 
named Bank M. 
x. Bank M is considered by PRIDE as a better partner compared to Standard Charter and 
other similar banks because Bank M provides quick service with less reporting. 
xi. PRIDE is approaching new potential financial partners (locally and internationally). 
xii. It seems that foreign borrowing is cheaper than borrowing from local institutions (But 
effective interest rates need to be calculated and compared). 
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Figure 1: PRIDE financial sources/partners  
(Tanzanian shillings) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ field research, August 2009. 
 
 
In sum, growth of lending to microfinance clientele is funded via borrowing but sustainability 
might be a question. Therefore, PRIDE needs to become a regulated MFI and hence be able to 
mobilise savings and raise shareholding equity. Social performance, meanwhile, is difficult to 
assess as there is no data collected by the institution. However, some indication can be 
derived from the mix of products offered by the MFI, i.e. if the proportion of group loans 
decreases in the mix of products (which means that individual lending of larger amounts 
increases), then this might be an indication of possible mission drift. 
 
Financial, service and informational relationships  
Figure 2 illustrates the most recent ego networks of PRIDE and SEDA and their common 
partners. It should be noted that these networks varied significantly over time – with very few 
shareholders involved in the early 1990s leading to larger numbers in recent years. The 
present network structure of June 2009 in figure 2 shows relationships based on financial, 
service and informational exchange. 
Service networks in the case of PRIDE reflect relationships with the University of Dar-es-
Salaam, the University of Norway, three risk rating agencies (namely ACCION, Microfinanza 
and MicroRate), a private consultancy from Bolivia and another one from China. Informational 
networks, on the other hand, are based on reporting relations with each lender (which can be 
annually or monthly). In this context, SELF was identified as the most onerous reporting in the 
past. Now, reporting is deemed to be similar across lenders. 
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Figure 2. Financial, service and informational relationships2 
 
 
 
 
 
It is interesting to observe that the majority of PRIDE’s financial partners are international 
actors while SEDA’s partners are a mixture of international and national. There are a couple of 
common financial providers but the majority of them seem to be exclusive to the MFIs under 
study. In both cases, multiple relationships are maintained with key partners. A crucial 
microfinance actor in the country is the Financial Service Deepening Trust (FSDT) which in turn 
is formed by a consortium of five international donors. The FSDT is a firm supporter of MFIs in 
Tanzania but also, and perhaps more strongly, of informal microfinance initiatives that 
promote savings accumulation amongst low-income communities particularly in rural areas – 
an activity that is regarded as more related to poverty reduction than the provision of credit. 
 
Conclusion and next steps 
In general terms, Tanzania presents an incipient microfinance market where existing NGOs are 
struggling to survive in an evolving regulatory environment. Transformation to a regulated 
financial institution is the model followed by the two MFIs under study and hence determining 
who their shareholders are is an immediate priority. Preliminary analysis and network 
structures show that some key existing financial partners might be the most likely 
shareholders/owners of these new MFIs, given that local potential actors are few and less 
likely to be able to make significant investments in microfinance. More precise analysis will be 
undertaken in the next research activities.     
                                                          
2
 The types of relationships are: financial = loans and shares; services = capacity building and training; 
and informational = reports about the status of the MFI and its final clients. 
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